KPI 05
Who buys European space companies?
Share of acquisitions by foreign buyers
35%
→ 15% in 2036
42.9%
of 2036 target
Off track
Ten indicators to 2036
Selected 2036 targets
KPI 05
Share of acquisitions by foreign buyers
35%
→ 15% in 2036
42.9%
of 2036 target
Off track
| Indicator | Latest value · period | Target | Progress | Evidence | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
KPI 01 European orbital launches per yearAssured, independent European access to space. | 7–9 (conflicting evidence) Calendar year 2025 | At least 20 launches per year by 2036 · Target hypothesis | At risk | ⚑ Conflicting evidence | SourcesESA (Europe's Spaceport 2025 review); Ars Technica (secondary); supplied brief Calendar year 2025 Provisional assessment. Every candidate 2025 value (7, 8 or 9) is less than half the target of 20, and no multi-year trend has yet been recorded. The conflict between values does not change the assessment. low_confidence conflicting_evidence Exact evidence and observations → |
KPI 02 Operational European launch providersA diversified and competitive European launch sector. | 2 operational (Arianespace, Avio) + 1 orbit-proven (Isar Aerospace) Status documented up to 9 September 2026 | At least 3 operational providers by 2036 · Target hypothesis | On track | ⚑ Partially verified | SourcesESA (exploitation arrangements, Vega-C page, Spectrum launch statement); Isar Aerospace Status documented up to 9 September 2026 50% of the gap from the baseline (2025) to the target has been closed by 2026 (status to 9 Sep 2026), against 9% of the timeframe to 2036 elapsed. Exact evidence and observations → |
KPI 03 European share of capital raised in European space funding roundsEuropean control over the financing of strategic space companies. | 69% 2024–2025 (two-year period) | 90% of capital value by 2036 · Target hypothesis (no target year supplied) | At risk | ✓ Verified primary evidence | SourcesESPI Report 102, Space Venture 2025 (April 2026) 2024–2025 (two-year period) Provisional assessment. 69% is 21 percentage points below the 90% target. Five of the nine 2025 scaleup rounds tracked by ESPI were led by European public entities; all four privately anchored rounds were led by American investors. Only one two-year value is recorded, so no trend can yet be assessed. Exact evidence and observations → |
KPI 04 Private capital raised by European space companies per yearA deep European capital market for space innovation. | €1.4bn 2025 | €3.5bn per year by 2036 · Target hypothesis | At risk | ⚑ Partially verified | SourcesESPI Space Venture reports 2023–2025 2025 16% of the gap from the baseline (2022) to the target has been closed by 2025, against 21% of the timeframe to 2036 elapsed. Exact evidence and observations → |
KPI 05 Foreign buyers in acquisitions of European space companiesRetaining European control over strategic space companies and technologies. | 35% 2014–2025 (cumulative) | 15% or less by 2036 · Target hypothesis | Off track | ⚑ Partially verified | SourcesESPI Report 102, Space Venture 2025 (April 2026) 2014–2025 (cumulative) Provisional assessment. The cumulative share (35%) is more than double the 15% ceiling. Only a single cumulative value exists; no annual trend is available. Exact evidence and observations → |
KPI 06 SMEs' share of European Defence Fund fundingAn open and innovative European defence and space industrial base. | >21% EDF 2025 calls (results April 2026) | 30% of funding by 2036 · Target hypothesis (no target year supplied) | On track | ✓ Verified primary evidence | SourcesEuropean Commission (DG DEFIS) EDF 2025 calls (results April 2026) 25% of the gap from the baseline (EDF 2023 calls) to the target has been closed by EDF 2025 calls, against 15% of the timeframe to 2036 elapsed. Exact evidence and observations → |
KPI 07 IRIS² satellites deployedSovereign EU secure connectivity. | 0 of at least 348 (inferred) As described by ESA, 30 October 2026 | 100% deployed by 2036 · Target hypothesis | Not yet measurable | ⚑ Partially verified | SourcesESA IRIS² programme page; European Commission As described by ESA, 30 October 2026 Deployment is not scheduled to begin until 2029, so progress against the deployment target cannot yet be measured. This is not an assessment of poor performance. Exact evidence and observations → |
KPI 08 · Threat indicator European air traffic exposed to GNSS interferenceResilience of European positioning, navigation and timing. | 38% 2021 (latest documented) | No autonomy target set No defensible target established | Not classified (threat indicator) | ⚑ Outdated evidence | SourcesEUROCONTROL (Network Manager User Forum presentation) 2021 (latest documented) Threat and vulnerability indicator without an autonomy target. It is not forced into a performance category and is excluded from the status counts. outdated no_target Exact evidence and observations → |
KPI 09 New critical-infrastructure navigation equipment supporting authenticated GNSSResilience of European positioning, navigation and timing. | Not yet measured No reporting period | 100% of relevant new equipment procured after 2030 Target hypothesis (applies to procurement after 2030) | Not yet measurable | ⚑ Source verification pending | SourcesNo reliable source identified No reporting period No reliable measurement exists. Missing data is not evidence of poor performance. low_confidence unverified no_baseline no_target_year Exact evidence and observations → |
KPI 10 Business users' share of active Copernicus data usersCommercial uptake of EU space data. | 7% (unverified) Period not stated | 20% business users by 2036 · Target hypothesis (no target year supplied) | Not yet measurable | ⚑ Source verification pending | SourcesSupplied brief (source verification pending) Period not stated The available value is an estimate or not yet traced to a source that supports it. low_confidence unverified Exact evidence and observations → |
KPI 11 Public space spending as a share of GDPSufficient public investment to sustain European space capabilities. | 0.07% of GDP (case figure) 2025 (reporting year to be confirmed) | 0.12% of GDP by 2036 · Group hypothesis | Not yet measurable | ⚑ Source verification pending | SourcesPhase 10 case brief (source verification pending) 2025 (reporting year to be confirmed) The available value is an estimate or not yet traced to a source that supports it. low_confidence unverified Exact evidence and observations → |
KPI 12 Share of European public space money under direct EU controlPooled EU-level control of strategic space investment. | about 2% (€230m of €10.9bn, case figures) 2025 (reporting year to be confirmed) | 15% by 2036 · Group hypothesis | Not yet measurable | ⚑ Source verification pending | SourcesPhase 10 case brief (source verification pending) 2025 (reporting year to be confirmed) The available value is an estimate or not yet traced to a source that supports it. low_confidence unverified Exact evidence and observations → |
ESA (Europe's Spaceport 2025 review); Ars Technica (secondary); supplied brief
Calendar year 2025
Provisional assessment. Every candidate 2025 value (7, 8 or 9) is less than half the target of 20, and no multi-year trend has yet been recorded. The conflict between values does not change the assessment.
low_confidence
conflicting_evidence
Exact evidence and observations →ESA (exploitation arrangements, Vega-C page, Spectrum launch statement); Isar Aerospace
Status documented up to 9 September 2026
50% of the gap from the baseline (2025) to the target has been closed by 2026 (status to 9 Sep 2026), against 9% of the timeframe to 2036 elapsed.
Exact evidence and observations →ESPI Report 102, Space Venture 2025 (April 2026)
2024–2025 (two-year period)
Provisional assessment. 69% is 21 percentage points below the 90% target. Five of the nine 2025 scaleup rounds tracked by ESPI were led by European public entities; all four privately anchored rounds were led by American investors. Only one two-year value is recorded, so no trend can yet be assessed.
Exact evidence and observations →ESPI Space Venture reports 2023–2025
2025
16% of the gap from the baseline (2022) to the target has been closed by 2025, against 21% of the timeframe to 2036 elapsed.
Exact evidence and observations →ESPI Report 102, Space Venture 2025 (April 2026)
2014–2025 (cumulative)
Provisional assessment. The cumulative share (35%) is more than double the 15% ceiling. Only a single cumulative value exists; no annual trend is available.
Exact evidence and observations →European Commission (DG DEFIS)
EDF 2025 calls (results April 2026)
25% of the gap from the baseline (EDF 2023 calls) to the target has been closed by EDF 2025 calls, against 15% of the timeframe to 2036 elapsed.
Exact evidence and observations →ESA IRIS² programme page; European Commission
As described by ESA, 30 October 2026
Deployment is not scheduled to begin until 2029, so progress against the deployment target cannot yet be measured. This is not an assessment of poor performance.
Exact evidence and observations →EUROCONTROL (Network Manager User Forum presentation)
2021 (latest documented)
Threat and vulnerability indicator without an autonomy target. It is not forced into a performance category and is excluded from the status counts.
outdated
no_target
Exact evidence and observations →No reliable source identified
No reporting period
No reliable measurement exists. Missing data is not evidence of poor performance.
low_confidence
unverified
no_baseline
no_target_year
Exact evidence and observations →Supplied brief (source verification pending)
Period not stated
The available value is an estimate or not yet traced to a source that supports it.
low_confidence
unverified
Exact evidence and observations →Phase 10 case brief (source verification pending)
2025 (reporting year to be confirmed)
The available value is an estimate or not yet traced to a source that supports it.
low_confidence
unverified
Exact evidence and observations →Phase 10 case brief (source verification pending)
2025 (reporting year to be confirmed)
The available value is an estimate or not yet traced to a source that supports it.
low_confidence
unverified
Exact evidence and observations →Indicators being built. Not part of the twelve-tile view or the meter until a measured baseline and Tier 1–2 evidence are registered.
KPI 09 · in development
New critical-infrastructure navigation equipment supporting authenticated GNSSBaseline under construction: the measurement method and first observation are still being defined.
Target: 100% of relevant new equipment procured after 2030
KPI 10 · in development
Business users' share of active Copernicus data usersCurrent figure is an estimate awaiting a verifiable source.
Target: 20% business users
Candidate
Europe's share of global orbital launches
Derivable once KPI 01 is resolved and a comparable same-year global launch total is verified.