Capability C09
Critical-infrastructure navigation receivers
GNSS receivers and timing equipment used in critical infrastructure.
⚑ Draft assessment — requires reviewConfidence: Low
Recommended approach
Buy
Last reviewed 9 Nov 2026
Rationale (analytical judgement)
Buy on the open market, with procurement requirements for authentication support.
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Three main questions
- How critical?
- High — Receivers determine whether authentication and multi-constellation resilience are actually used.
- Pressure risk
- Medium — could an external provider use the dependency as political or economic pressure?
- Alternative in 24 months?
- Yes
Current position
- European capability
- Uptake of authentication-capable receivers is not measured (see KPI 09).
- External dependencies
- Receivers are bought on a global market; manufacturer origin and authentication support are not documented.
- Main external actors
- Global receiver manufacturers (not yet specified)
Additional factors
Factors without a recorded assessment are shown as not yet assessed.
- Cost of developing European capacity
- Not yet assessed
- Time to operational readiness
- Not yet assessed
- Availability of trusted partners
- Not yet assessed
- Market concentration
- Not yet assessed.
- Technological maturity
- Not yet assessed
- Impact on innovation and competitiveness
- Not yet assessed
- Security and resilience
- Requirement for OSNMA support in procurement could be set without building European production.
Recommendation history
Manual adjustments with their documented explanation.
No adjustments yet
The draft recommendation has not been changed.
Relevant KPIs
- KPI 09 New critical-infrastructure navigation equipment supporting authenticated GNSS
Measures authentication support in receivers.
⚑ Suggested link — not validated
Related risks
- R4 Deterrence versus arms race
Receivers determine resilience to spoofing.
⚑ Suggested link — not validated